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This may be a difficult book for some philosophers to read, in a number of ways. First and foremost, 
it is written by someone who orbits and even penetrates the discipline of philosophy in a professional 
capacity, yet he is calling for its end. More precisely, its author, Henri Lefebvre (1901-1991), is saying 
stop whatever philosophy you’re currently doing. On the one hand, this is a clarion call to philosophers 
around the world to take philosophy to its limits and beyond. On the other hand, it offers a bleak take 
on the contemporary relevance of philosophical inquiry. To Lefebvre, much of philosophy is 
moribund and has been so for some time. That is, of course, if it is not already dead. Lefebvre identifies 
eleven aporia that he deems to be at the heart of philosophy’s withering away, all of which detail the 
contradiction of the gap between the real and the idea; everyday life and the privileged position of the 
philosopher. In a way, it could even be seen as anti-philosophy. Regardless of where it stands on any 
philosophical purity spectrum, it is above all inspired by Marx’s famous theses on Feuerbach, 
specifically the eleventh thesis: ‘Philosophers have only interpreted the world; the point, however, is 
to change it.’ Lefebvre is, essentially, saying that the world cannot change if philosophy does not 
change, and the world ought to change. 
Other than using the moniker ‘Marxist,’ Lefebvre would often describe himself, at least in the 
latter half of his career, as a metaphilosopher, eschewing the standard disciplinary titles of 
philosopher, geographer, and sociologist, among others. Lefebvre was, of course, all of these things 
and none of these things. As the title suggests, Metaphilosophy is a book about going beyond 
philosophy. Superseding philosophy has always been part of the Marxist program. Realizing 
philosophy and living it in one’s everyday life is what is meant by superseding philosophy. Such is 
the case that Lefebvre presents throughout the book. 
It is quite remarkable how Lefebvre was able to craft such an in-depth and comprehensive text 
(over 300 pages) in a relatively short amount of time – August 1963 to November 1964. As the author 
of more than 70 books during his 90 years on earth, this is certainly consistent with his publishing 
practices. Some of this can be attributed to his brilliant intellect, some of it to his tireless work ethic, 
and part of it to his method of dictating his texts to a scribe. The latter item makes for a conversational 
tone that has fits and starts, and one can imagine Lefebvre’s mind racing in various directions as he 
spoke the words. Like many of Lefebvre’s works, Metaphilosophy is very much a non-linear text. 
Argumentative threads seem to come and go, sometimes seemingly out of nowhere. This is a 
necessary, albeit frequently frustrating, aspect of Lefebvre’s dialectical style, and it applies to both 
the prose and the structure. An example of the latter is most evident with the ‘table of forms, systems, 
structures’ put forth in the first chapter, titled ‘Prolegomena: Notice to Readers.’ The reader is 
instructed to return to the table over and over again, every so often. Chapters could be re-arranged 
into several different patterns, as could a bulk of the sentences. Arguments are suspended, only to 
return at a later point in the text or another text entirely. 
Lefebvre’s core influences appear on almost all of the pages, with allusions and citations of 
Hegel, Nietzsche, Axelos, and, to a lesser extent, Heidegger. Above all else and anyone else, Lefebvre 
is most indebted to Marx, which is made abundantly clear throughout. It is quite obvious that Lefebvre 
sees himself as an heir of sorts, almost as if the title of the fifth chapter—The Search for Heirs—is a 
reference to himself. At the time of the book’s genesis in the mid-1960s, Lefebvre would have been 
considered by many to be the runner-up to Louis Althusser, whose structural Marxism is diametrically 
opposed to Lefebvre's humanist Marxism. 
Lefebvre covers a lot of ground in this book, and many of its themes will be familiar to readers 
of his other work. Alienation, dialectic, moments, style, and so on, are peppered throughout. There are,  




however, three terms that stand above the rest in Metaphilosophy: Praxis, Mimesis, and Poeisis. These 
three concepts are the main foci of Lefebvre’s argument. Lefebvre seems to play hide and seek with 
these terms, searching to pin them down and define them in various ways, all while they seemingly 
wriggle free and morph into something else. These three terms are interrelated, with each being defined 
throughout the course of the book. Praxis is akin to practice, yet something beyond it, poiesis is akin 
to creation, yet also something else, and mimesis is similar to repetition, but cannot be reduced to it. 
Metaphilosophy wrestles with these three terms, yet never entirely settles on what exactly they are. 
Such elliptical manoeuvers are a hallmark of Lefebvre’s approach to his many other texts. 
Two broad themes have emerged from the English translations of Lefebvre’s work. The first 
is Lefebvre’s Critique of Everyday Life, whose three volumes have all been translated, along with 
related texts, such as Everyday Life in the Modern World and Rhythmanalysis. The second theme is 
space, with books like The Production of Space, The Urban Revolution, Writings on Cities, Toward 
an Architecture of Enjoyment, and last year’s translation of Marxist Thought and the City. These two 
themes are substantial parts of Lefebvre’s oeuvre, and often stand in the way of Lefebvre’s other 
scholarly contributions on the state, history, literature, philosophical figures, etc. Metaphilosophy is a 
book that cuts across all of these themes, even linking them together like a red thread, and could be 
used as an introduction to Lefebvre’s thought, more generally, even though it is not something one 
would consider to be at the introductory level. 
There are two guides included in this book that are helpful for the reader. Lefebvre’s text is 
bookended by an in-depth introduction by longtime Lefebvre scholar, Stuart Elden, and an equally 
intriguing postface, written in 1997, by the late Georges Labica. In his introduction, Elden argues that 
Metaphilosophy helped lay some of the groundwork for the field of cultural studies, several decades 
avant la lettre (xi). This is not readily apparent, especially if one only glances at the chapter titles, half 
of which include the keyword ‘philosophy,’ or a variation thereof. One must burrow much deeper into 
the text to get at Lefebvre’s message(s) and tarry with them, even if they appear to be going astray. 
One could say that Lefebvre shares a compositional bond with Frankfurt Schooler Theodor Adorno, 
as far as thematic choices and dialectical argumentation and presentation go. Indeed, it is through the 
weaving, sprawling, herky-jerky writing that reveals the seeds of many key topics that would fascinate 
cultural theorists in the decades following the publication of this book, albeit without the same 
recognition bestowed upon Adorno for his analyses of the culture industry. 
Despite Lefebvre’s belated and slowly developed recognition as an important continental 
thinker, this book, composed five decades ago, is a text worthy of one’s time and effort, especially for 
those interested in thinking about and beyond the boundaries of philosophy. Early in the text, Lefebvre 
gives the most succinct summary of his main argument: ‘Philosophy must be superseded. It realizes 
itself by superseding itself and abolishes itself by realizing itself’ (17). An immediate solution to this, 
according to Lefebvre, is to study the early work of Marx. Lefebvre is quick to point out that Marx’s 
early work is often wrongly described as philosophical, as it is actually metaphilosophical. Lefebvre 
does acknowledge that Marx’s work is an incomplete starting point. Nevertheless, Lefebvre does sell 
himself quite short and does not acknowledge the innovation and importance of his own work. This 
text shows that Henri Lefebvre’s work deserves a place alongside other notable 20th century 
continental thinkers, such as the Frankfurt School, Heidegger, Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, and 
Louis Althusser. For those looking to take philosophy to its limits and beyond, one would be hard 
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